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Contemporary legal writing treats freedom of the seas as an
axiomatic principle of international law, but the law of the sea has
historically exhibited a cyclical character. Though actual Roman rule of
the Mediterranean was absolute, the Justinian Code declared that the
sea was not subject to ownership, and that it and its resources were
available to all men.' During the Middle Ages, Italian city-states
claimed adjacent sea areas and required fees of vessels wishing to
transit.2 Northern European states exercised similar control in the
Baltic and North Sea, and it was under the fifteenth and sixteenth
century grants of the Papal Bulls to Spain and Portugal that the concept
of individual nations' sovereignty over areas of the oceans waxed full. 3
English and Dutch fortunes rose as Spanish and Portuguese influence
declined, and, as counsel for the Dutch East India Company, Hugo
Grotius introduced the concepts of freedom of the seas that have
persisted to the present. 4
During the last thirty years, there has been a return to the practice
of individual nations assuming sovereignty over wide areas of the
ocean. The first significant assumption of such wide authority was
made by the United States in the Presidential Proclamations of 1945. 5
These proclamations were followed by a series of claims by other
nations which exceeded the carefully advanced interests of the United
States. In 1966, the United States Congress expanded the area of
exclusive fishing rights to a limit of twelve miles, 6 and on March 1,
1977, a new law extending this limit to two hundred miles became
effective. 7 Because of the vast area involved and the potential economic
impact of the new fishery act, interest in coastal law enforcement has
increased.
Enforcement Procedure
There are four requirements that must be met in the successful
completion of any enforcement effort, regardless of the interest being
protected or the area of the coastal zone in which the suspect activity
' S. SWARZTRAU1BER, THE THREE MILE LIMIT OF TERRITORIAL SEAS 10 (1972).
2 Id. at 11.
3 Id. at 11-12.
4 Id. at 16-20.
5 Pres. Proc. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-1948 Compilation), Pres. Proc. 2668, 3 C.F.R.
68 (1943-1948 Compilation).
6 Bartlett Act (Twelve Mile Fishery Jurisdiction), Act of Oct. 14, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-658, §§ 1-4, 80 Stat. 908 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-94 (1970) ).
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat.
331 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-82).
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arises. The enforcement officer must have the authority to enforce the
provision of law violated; he must detect the violation; he must
investigate and document the violation; and he must apprehend the
violator.
A. Responsibility for Enforcement
The legislation creating the fishery conservation zone assigns
enforcement responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce and the
Secretary of Transportation (in whose department the Coast Guard
operates). The two Secretaries are authorized to utilize the facilities of
any state or federal agency (including the Defense Department) in their
enforcement efforts." It is to be expected that primary enforcement
responsibility will fall on the Coast Guard and the National Marine
Fisheries Service as it has under previous fishery laws. 9 However, the
sheer size of the zone and the fact that Congress specifically addressed
the possibility of Defense Department assistance raises the question of
whether enforcement responsibilities should be assigned to the mili-
tary and, if so, what the nature and extent of those responsibilities
should be.
International law presents no obstacles to the military enforcement
of fishery law. Australia, Britain, Canada, Eire, and New Zealand all
give fishery law enforcement authority to their armed forces. 10 In fact:
International law favors the use of naval craft because of their
distinctive character, rendering confusion unlikely among fisher-
men. Thus, the right of hot pursuit may be exercised, under the
1958 Convention of the High Seas 'only by war ships or military
aircraft, or other ships or aircraft on government service specially
authorized to that effect.'1 1
Within the United States, however, there is a general feeling that
law enforcement is not the proper concern of the military. This notion
is embodied in the Posse Comitatus Act 12 which prohibits the use of
Army and Air Force personnel to enforce civilian laws unless au-
thorized to do so by Congress. Although the act addresses only the
Army and the Air Force, Naval Regulation makes the act applicable to
the Navy and Marine Corps. 13 There is little difficulty, however, in
justifying a fisheries enforcement exception to the Act. The Depart-
ment of Navy's Law of the Sea Section adopted the position that naval
fishery enforcement was not prohibited by the Posse Comitatus Act
shortly after the 1970 amendments to the Bartlett Act provided for
8 Id. at § 1861 (a).
9 See generally, Freeman, Alaska's Seagoing Detectives, 17 ALASKA 28 (May, 1976).10 Fidell, Fisheries Legislation: Naval Enforcement, 7 J. MAR. L. & COM. 355-58 (1976).
11 Id. at 358-59.
12 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1970).
13 Meeks, Illegal Law Enforcement, 70 MIL. L. REV. 83 (1975).
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other federal assistance to the Coast Guard. 14 Furthermore, the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 makes it clear that military
fishery enforcement in the two hundred mile zone is lawful.
The fact that military enforcement is legal under both international
and domestic law does not necessarily make it desirable from the
United States' viewpoint. Involvement of the Navy in all phases of the
enforcement work could put the nation's honor at stake in even the
most minor incidents and would put an unacceptable strain on the
Navy's ability to meet its already burdensome commitments. 15 Addi-
tionally, effective fishery enforcement on the part of the enforcement
officer requires extensive knowledge of fishing equipment and
methods, and the ability to identify a large number of fish species.
Either the training of navymen, or the assignment of experienced
fishery enforcement personnel to operating naval forces, would be an
inefficient application of resources.
The Coast Guard has the enforcement experience gained under
the Bartlett Act that can be directly applied to the extended fishery
zone. The Department of Defense could most efficiently serve the
enforcement by: (1) instructing its operating forces (ships and aircraft)
to report suspected fishery violations to the Coast Guard, and (2) being
prepared to respond with tactical aircraft and surface naval forces if
and when the Coast Guard is faced with a violator accompanied by
armed escort. The Coast Guard and Department of Defense, along
with the State Department, have already formulated a contingency
plan to cover the latter situation. 16
B. Detection of Violations
The first step in successful enforcement in the fishery conservation
zone is detecting violators in an area that is 2.2 million square miles1 7
larger than the contiguous fishery zone. In 1974 the Coast Guard was
instructed by Congress to evaluate all surveillance and enforcement
techniques including use of satellites, aircraft, radar, and remote
sensing devices, 18 with a view toward monitoring this vast area. As the
effective date of the exclusive fishery zone drew near, the Coast Guard
was greatly increasing the number and capabilities of its aircraft and
decided on a patrolling scheme.1 9 Recently, the Coast Guard Com-
mandant explained his approach to the detection problem:
14 Interview with Cdr. Al Walker, USN, Dep't Navy, Law of the Sea Section, in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 15, 1976). The Navy position was based on 16 U.S.C. § 1083
and 14 U.S.C. § 141.
Is Fidell, supra note 10, at 354.
16 Interview with Cdr. Al Walker, USN, Dep't Navy, Law of the Sea Section, in
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 25, 1976); Navy Times, Oct. 25, 1976, at 4, col. 1.
17 Navy Times, Oct. 25, 1976, at 4, col. 1.
II Fidell, The Coast Guard and Fisheries Law Enforcement, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS 75 (July, 1975).
19 Navy Times, supra note 17.
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We know where the fisheries exist at the present time and,
obviously, when we expand into a larger area the fish are not going
to change ... We're going to concentrate on those areas where
fishing has gone on over the last several years, with only a certain
amount of expansion to make certain that the permit requirements
are met and that the quotas are not exceeded...
Also to the extent that we can, we'll be going out beyond, to the
200-mile area, to see if there is any change in those patterns that
we're not anticipating.2"
The Fishery Act itself lays down the basis for requiring that foreign
vessels help police themselves. As a prerequisite to the United States
entering into an agreement under which a foreign nation's vessels will
be allowed to fish in the zone, the nation must agree to follow any
requirements concerning the installation and maintenance of trans-
ponders, and the presence and funding of observers, on their vessels.21
Transponders, upon electronic interrogation, would transmit posi-
tion and identity data to the Coast Guard. It is questionable, however,
if the United States could legally require operation of a transponder
outside the zone or while in a vessel merely transiting the zone. It
follows that any master of a vessel intending to engage in prohibited
activity in the zone is not going to be deterred by the fact that not
possessing or operating a transponder is also a violation. Thus, a
transponder system would show the Coast Guard the sites at which
the provisions of the act are being observed, but not where they are
being violated.
The use of people on board the fishing vessels who act as
observers is a more orthodox method of monitoring the observance of
fishery laws, but is not without problems. The size of the zone and the
number of foreign vessels that would be expected to operate in it
would require a huge number of observers. Even with the foreign
fishing industries supporting the costs of observers, there remains the
problem of finding large numbers of qualified people. One possible
solution is to give course credit for observing tours by students
engaged in ocean related studies. 22 Additionally, the use of observers
does not affect the problem posed by unlicensed violators who carry no
observers on board.
There appears to be no substitute for the patrolling of the zone.
Probably the most effective approach is that of the Commandant of the
Coast Guard, set out above, which can be accomplished by patrol
aircraft. The aircraft, upon sighting a suspected violator, could vector
20 Id.
2116 U.S.C. §1821 (c) (2) (C) & (D) (1976).
22 It is estimated that to put an observer on each foreign vessel fishing off Alaska
alone, and allowing for a relief every three to three and one-half months, would
require 6,000 men per year. Freeman, supra note 9, at 60.
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surface vessels to the scene, or if the violation was sufficiently
apparent, make the apprehension itself. This method has been suc-
cessfully applied by the Coast Guard in the enforcement of the
contiguous fishery zone. 23
C. Investigation
The goal of the enforcement effort is not realized in an individual
case until the successful completion of court action. To this end, the
enforcement officer must not only satisfy himself that a violation has
taken place; he must also document the circumstances surrounding the
violation. For successful prosecution, it is necessary that evidence be
obtained regarding the offending vessel's position and activities.
Accurate position fixes are of critical importance at the extreme
edges of the area to be enforced. In the case of the territorial sea and
contiguous fishery zones, the distances involved are such that radar
ranges are adequate to accurately fix a suspect vessel's position relative
to the nearest point of land. But radar alone will not be sufficient to fix
positions along the fringe of the two hundred mile zone. 24 The method
employed in this area must involve a combination of electronic
navigation systems such as an inertial navigation system, Loran, or
Omega, with the enforcement craft's radar. Thus, the enforcement
unit, whether ship or aircraft, will accurately fix its position in the zone
and, with the use of radar range and bearing to the suspect vessel, fix
that vessel's position relative to the limits of the zone. After allowing
for the maximum possible error in both the radio or inertial system and
radar fixes, the enforcement officer will know whether or not the
position element of the case will be supportable in court. 25
After a vessel's position is fixed within the zone, it is necessary to
document any activity violative of the laws governing the zone. This
may be done by photographing the illegal activity or by conducting an
inspection on board the suspect vessel. Photographs may be used not
only to document illegal activity but also as proof that a pursuit
subsequent to the photographing was justified.
23 Commandant of the Coast Guard Message R 0406412 NOV. 75.
24 Radar frequencies are basically line of sight, therefore 200 miles is greater than
the maximum range of surface-mounted radars due to the curvature of the earth. G.
DUNLAP & H. SHUFELOT, DUTTON's NAVIGATION AND PILOTING § 1608 (12th ed. 1969).
25 Accuracy of radar depends on the type of equipment used, its maintenance and
the experience of the operator. Radio navigation systems accuracy depends on the
type, atmospheric conditions, and whether a skywave or groundwave is received.
Loran-A is the least accurate with a maximum error of 5-7 miles over 80% of the
coverage area. G. DUNLAP & H. SHUFELOT, supra note 24, §§1604 (radar), 1808
(Loran-A), 3206 (Loran-C), 3101-3109 (Omega); for an example of the examination of
the accuracy of position fixing in a fisheries case involving radar fixes see The Red
Crusader, 35 I.L.R. 485 (1962). In the enforcement of the CFZ it has been discovered
that some violators deliberately misadjust their navigation equipment in order to
make it appear to enforcement personnel that their violation was unintentional.
Seagoing Detectives at 28.
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Boarding and inspection can turn up evidence of violations that
photographs cannot show conclusively. Thus when a vessel is ob-
served taking starfish in its nets, a search may turn up continental shelf
creatures that the vessel is not authorized to take. 26 Similarly, a vessel
that has been observed in the zone regularly over an unusually long
period may be found to be exceeding its quota. The suspect vessel's
own logbook may contain entries concerning activities in positions that
violate the laws of the zone. 27
D. Apprehension of Violators
When after detection and investigation by enforcement authorities
a violating vessel complies with directions to accept a boarding party
and be escorted to port, the enforcement officer need only turn over
the vessel, crew, and any evidence to the United States Attorney and
his immediate mission in that particular case is complete. But if, as is
often the case, the offending vessel attempts to flee, the enforcement
effort may only be beginning. The right of the enforcement craft to
pursue and seize offenders in such a situation is the subject of the
doctrine of hot pursuit.
The doctrine of hot pursuit came about through custom and has
been influenced by change of custom and the writings of publicists. 28
Initially the doctrine applied to violations occurring in the internal or
territorial waters of a state. 29 When the concept of the contiguous zone
was accepted in international law, the right of hot pursuit of contigu-
ous zone violators from that zone was recognized. 30 In more recent
years, the doctrine has been invoked against violators of two hundred
mile exclusive fishery zones. 31 In order to determine the present
prerequisites to applying the doctrine, it will be expedient to examine
the doctrine as codified in 1958 and determine what changes in the
doctrine have been worked by the changing usage and circumstances
of the past nineteen years.
The Convention on the High Seas provides in part:
Article 23
1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the
competent authorities of the coastal State have good reason to
believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that
State. Such pursuit must be commenced when the foreign ship or
26 As was the case in the Bartlett Act violation by the Tontini Pesca. Fidell, The Law
and Fishery Enforcement of the High Seas, U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 96 (July,
1975).
27 As was the case in the Yamasan Maru No. 85 in a CFZ violation, Secretary of
State Message P 172218Z JUL 76.
28 N. POULANTZAS, THE RIGHT OF HOT PURSUIT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 42-266 (1969).
29 Id. at 158-59.
30 Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
31 Fidell, Hot Pursuit From a Fisheries Zone, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 100-101 (1976).
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one of its boats is within the internal waters or the territorial sea or
the contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be
continued outside the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the
pursuit has not been interrupted. It is not necessary that, at the
time when the foreign ship within the territorial sea or the
contiguous zone receives the order to stop, the ship giving the
order should likewise be within the territorial sea or the contiguous
zone. If the foreign ship is within a contiguous zone, as defined in
article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu-
ous Zone, the pursuit may only be undertaken if there has been a
violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone was
established.
2. The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued
enters the territorial sea of its own country or of a third State.
3. Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing
ship has satisfied itself by such practicable means as may be
available that the ship pursued or one of its boats or other craft
working as a team and using the ship pursued as a mother ship are
within the limits of the territorial sea, or as the case may be within
the contiguous zone. The pursuit may only be commenced after a
visual or auditory signal to stop has been given at a distance which
enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship.
4. The right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or
military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft on government service
specially authorized to that effect.
5. Where hot pursuit is effected by an aircraft:
(a) The provisions of paragraph 1 to 3 of this article shall apply
mutatis mutandis;
(b) The aircraft giving the order to stop must itself actively
pursue the ship until a ship or aircraft of the coastal State,
summoned by the aircraft, arrives to take over the pursuit, unless
the aircraft is itself able to arrest the ship. It does not suffice to
justify an arrest on the high seas that the ship was merely sighted
by the aircraft as an offender or suspected offender, if it was not
both ordered to stop and pursued by the aircraft or ships which
continue the pursuit without interruption ...
7. Where a ship has been stopped or arrested on the high seas in
circumstances which do not justify the exercise of the right of hot
pursuit, it shall be compensated for any loss or damage that may
have been thereby sustained. 32
Since 1958 the principal question to arise regarding the doctrine is
whether it is applicable only to violations of the contiguous fishery
zone or to the larger two hundred mile exclusive fishery zones and
continental shelf areas.
Clearly Congress intended the contiguous fishery zone to give rise
to the right of hot pursuit as is evidenced by the language: "[t]he
United States will exercise the same exclusive rights in respect to
fisheries in the zone as it has in the territorial sea... ,.33 The rights
32 Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200.
33 16 U.S.C. § 1091 (1966).
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claimed by the United States over the two hundred mile fishery zone
and continental shelf areas are no less exclusive. 34
A challenge to the power of the United States to conduct hot
pursuit from the contiguous fishery zone came in the case of the
fishing vessel Taiyo Maru No. 28.35 The vessel was detected fishing
one and one-half miles inside the contiguous fishery zone. After being
signaled to stop, the vessel fled the zone and was seized 67.9 miles at
sea. The defendants in the case sought dismissal of all civil and
criminal charges on the grounds that the United States had by
international agreement territorially limited its power to seize foreign
vessels for violations of its fishery laws. 36 Defendants contended that
the hot pursuit and seizure violated Article 23 of the 1958 Convention
of the High Seas. The court held that, "Article 23 does not deny a
coastal State the right to commence hot pursuit from a contiguous zone
established for a purpose other than one of the purposes listed in
Article 24" of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone. 3 7 The court further noted that there is no provision of interna-
tional law preventing coastal States from establishing contiguous
fishery zones, and held that the above-mentioned Conventions "[c]on-
tain no specific undertaking by the United States not to conduct hot
pursuit from a contiguous fisheries zone extending 12 miles from its
coast," and that therefore "[t]he United States has not by treaty
'imposed a territorial limitation upon its own authority'." 38
Dr. Poulantzas, lecturer in international law at the University of
Utrecht, would disagree with the method used by the court in
achieving this result. He states that regarding Article 23 of the
Convention on the High Seas:
In case it is objected that the term contiguous zone - which is
also embodied in three other places in Article 23 on hot pursuit -
refers to any other contiguous zone of the coastal State than that of
Article 24, [of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contigu-
ous Zone], it is submitted that such a sophistic and misleading
interpretation, which might only be used to serve the interests of
certain coastal States should be condemned as contrary to the
context and the raison d'etre of this provision. 39
However, he goes on to say that:
Nevertheless, notwithstanding what was laid down in the
Geneva Convention on the High Seas, if coastal States establish
adjacent zones for other purposes within the limit of twelve miles,
claiming within them exclusive rights of use, control and enforce-
34 16 U.S.C. § 1812 (1976).
35 United States v. F/V Taiyo Maru, No. 28, 395 F. Supp. 413 (1975).
36. Id. at 415.
37 Id. at 419.
38 Id. at 420, quoting from Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
39 N. POULANTZAS, supra note 28, at 166.
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ment, it would be quite unrealistic to refuse these States the rights
of hot pursuit for the protection of such adjacent zones.40
Thus, in his 1969 work, Dr. Poulantzas declares that an exclusive
fishery zone of twelve miles, "according to recent developments in
international practice is no longer considered as contrary to interna-
tional law."'4 1 He then condemns unilateral extension of exclusive
fishery authority beyond twelve miles.
But events have been moving so rapidly in the last half decade that
one can paraphrase Dr. Poulantzas and state that an exclusive fishery
zone of two hundred miles, "according to recent developments in
international practice is no longer considered as contrary to interna-
tional law." If the treaty law concepts of rebus sic stantibus andjus cogens
are applicable anywhere, they are applicable to this area of the law. 42
Thus, the enforcement officer can look to the 1958 Convention on
the High Seas for guidance on what rules govern hot pursuit, but any
provision that can be read as limiting the initiation of a pursuit to an
area within twelve miles of the coast has lost its effect. This fact is
further evidenced by the contents of the Informal Single Negotiating
Text from the 1975 UN Law of the Sea Conference, which provides for
hot pursuit from the two hundred mile zone and continental shelf
areas.
4 3
When a vessel, reasonably believed to be violating the provisions
of a particular zone, attempts to flee or otherwise resists apprehension,
the enforcement officer is faced with the problem of how to physically
effect the apprehension. The use of force in enforcing national laws
over foreign vessels is, of course, a matter of great concern to those
charged with carrying out the will of Congress in the coastal zone. It
should be the goal of every enforcement officer to effect apprehensions
of suspect vessels in a professional manner, indicating that the
integrity of the zone must be respected, while at the same time
minimizing the potential for international friction. Professionally meet-
ing resistance to apprehension is the greatest challenge to enforcement
personnel.
The standard for the use of force was set out in the reports of
commissioners concerning the claim of the British vessel, I'm Alone. 44
During the prohibition era, the I'm Alone was the subject of hot pursuit
by the Coast Guard. After two days of unsuccessful pursuit, the
40 Id. at 167.
41 Id. at 185-86.
42 See Fawcett, Problems Concerning the Establishment of Exclusive Fishery Rights,
U.N.C. Sea Grant Publication UNC-SG-74-01 at 1 (1974).
43 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP/8/Part II, Art. 97(2) at 36 (1975), 14 INT'L LEG. MAT.
682 (1975), cited in Fidell, Hot Pursuit From a Fisheries Zone, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 95, 101
(1976).
44 Claim of the British Ship, "I'm Alone" v. United States, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 326
(1935).
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pursuing vessel intentionally fired into the I'm Alone, sinking her. The
commissioners held that the United States might "use necessary and
reasonable force for the purpose of effecting the objects of boarding,
searching, seizing, and bringing into port the suspected vessel; and if
sinking should occur incidentally, as a result of the exercise of
necessary and reasonable force for such purpose, the pursuing vessel
might be entirely blameless." 45 However, the intentional sinking was
held to be unjustified by any principle of international law.4 6
Another well-documented incident involving the use of force in
fishery law enforcement arose between the British trawler, Red
Crusader, and the Danish enforcement vessel, Neils Ebbsen. 47 Having
gained control over a Danish boarding party, 48 the master of the Red
Crusader attempted to flee Danish territorial waters. Neils Ebbsen
pursued, and while in Danish waters, fired solid shot of different
calibers at the masts and antenna of Red Crusader. The firing stopped
without inflicting serious damage and, enroute to British waters, the
vessels were joined by H.M.S. Troubridge whose officers maneuvered
her in such a manner as to allow Red Crusader's escape. A Commission
of Enquiry found that Neils Ebbsen's officers "exceeded legitimate use of
armed force" and further found that "officers of the British Royal Navy
made every effort to avoid any recourse to violence between Neils
Ebbsen and Red Crusader. Such an attitude and conduct were impecca-
ble. ' '4 9 Professor O'Connell, a reserve naval officer and professor of
international law, comments:
The Red Crusader case suggests that every device, including,
presumably, harrassment by navigational means, must be
employed and for a sufficient period of time before force is
justified. This puts the commander in a difficult position, for
harassment can lead to situations where the rule of the road
becomes unclear, and a collision may result.50
The enforcement officer must apply the principles of international
law to situations involving circumstances that vary from case to case.
From these two reported cases it appears that force that may result in
the sinking of the pursued vessel may be lawfully employed if
"necessary and reasonable" to effect the apprehension, but that the
firing of solid shot at the masts of a vessel attempting to escape and
4s Id. at 328.
46 Id. at 330.
47 The Red Crusader, 35 I.L.R. 485 (1962), facts digested with comment in D.
O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 66 (1975).
48 Apparently abduction is one of the hazards of the fishery enforcement field. In
October, 1974, "Ohio fish and wildlife authorities surprised the Canadian fishing tug
Cliffside on Lake Erie. The vessel was boarded, a scuffle ensued, and the Ohio
enforcement agent (who had used 'chemical mace' in the process) found himself the
recipient of a free, involuntary trip to Canada." Fidell, supra note 26, at 96.
49 35 I.L.R. 485 and D. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 66-67.
so D. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 67.
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simultaneously to kidnap a boarding party exceeds "legitimate use of
armed force."
Exactly determining the actual international custom and usage
regarding employment of force in fishery protection is complicated by
the numerous cases of use of extreme force by Latin American nations
in fishery incidents which never reach an international tribunal. In one
such incident, in June 1968, the Soviet vessels Pavlovo and Golfstrim
were detected fishing in an area that might, arguably, be deemed to be
a portion of Argentina's two hundred mile territorial sea. After the
fishing vessels ignored an order to stop and attempted to proceed
toward high seas, the Argentine destroyer Santa Cruz fired five
explosive rounds resulting in considerable damage to the Golfstrim.
After paying a fine under protest and making a formal protest, the
Soviet Government received only a verbal reply from the Argentine
Government to the effect that the incident was a matter for the local
courts.
5 1
The greatest danger of international conflict arising out of the use
of force in fishery protection arises when a nation which does not
recognize a fishery zone sends armed escorts to protect its vessels from
seizure. Such situations arose in the French-Brazilian lobster dispute of
1964 and the extended British-Icelandic "Cod War." Such confronta-
tions are not expected to occur in the United States fishery zone, but
plans to cover such a contingency have been made.5 2 Professor
O'Connell notes that:
[F]or the purpose of asserting or protecting rights in sea areas
which are subject to legal dispute, a primary axiom is that the force
used must be superior, or at least capable to the requisite degree of
support in the event of challenge... [Brazil acted consistently with
this axiom] when she dispatched the 6 in. cruiser Barroso, five
destroyers and two corvettes to overawe the French fishery protec-
tion vessel Tartu during the 'spiny lobster war.'5 3
Presumably, the Department of Defense is ready to provide such
superior force if the need arises. In such a situation the object would be
to make resistance to the force so futile as to avoid the necessity of its
application. In the enforcement of the fishery zone, it is probable that
the United States will limit, by strict rules of engagement, the use of
force to situations in which it would be "necessary and reasonable."
Just which situations fall into that category is a question to be
determined by the drafters of the rules and the officers who must apply
them.
51 Id. at 67-68.
52 Navy Times, supra note 17.
53 D. O'CONNELL, supra note 47, at 7.
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Conclusion.
Lack of effective international regulation has allowed many valu-
able fisheries to become depleted. If adoption of the two hundred mile
exclusive fishing zone is to be worth the political costs, enforcement
must be strict and thorough. The prosperity of the United States
fishing industry and the preservation of a reliable and renewable food
supply are at stake.
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